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Abstract
B.A., Nankai University, 1991, Weixiong He
Income Growth across U.S. States: An Empirical Analysis
The purpose of this study is to test the convergence hypothesis that prevails the 
neo-classical economic literature. In light of research on cross-country economic growth, 
the paper is adopting the same kind of methodology in studying income growth across 
U.S. states. The paper starts with a survey of literature in the study of growth of 
convergence. Then it tries to define the term of “convergence” in various economic 
implications, in particular the notion of “8-Convergence” versus “(3-Convergence”, 
“conditional convergence” versus “absolute convergence”, and such popular notion as 
“club convergence”. The paper then goes into the quantitative analysis of U.S. per capita 
personal income change in a time series. The time-series data is firstly divided up by U.S. 
census regions and the pattern of regional income change overtime is carefully identified. 
8-Convergence is tested by plotting personal income dispersion across U.S. states in time 
series from 1958 to 1996. (3-Convergence is tested by doing a simple regression of 
personal income growth on personal income at its initial level. The issue of alleged 
divergence since 1980s is carefully addressed and the importance of State Price Index is 
evaluated for the sake of the accuracy of economic studies on convergence and growth. 
The paper ended with a multiple-regression analysis aiming at identifying some attributes 
and determinants of income growth at state level.
Introduction
A new growth theory has emerged out of the vast economic controversies in the 
long-term economic growth in the past decades. The large amount of economic literature 
has been specially devoted to the study of long-term convergence in income, output and 
productivity between countries as well as national regions. The mainly empirical debate 
has promoted the development of the endogenous growth theory as an alternative to the 
conventional neoclassical exogenous theories. Conventional neoclassical model has 
treated such factors as technological change and human capital as exogenous and implies 
that per capita output in a regional economy will converge to a same level regardless of 
its initial capital endowments. This seemingly automatic converging mechanism has been 
largely controversial and more and more economists have found that there exists different 
growth patterns among countries and regions. This paper seeks to test the convergence 
hypothesis by using different approaches with different empirical evidences. It will 
identify the growth pattern of U.S. states in the past thirty years and attempt to explain 
the reasons that caused such growth differential between states.
Survey of Literature
Starting with Romer (1986) and Lucas (1988), a body of theoretical research and 
empirical studies has challenged the implication of the neoclassical theory. The New 
Growth theorists have challenged the convergence hypothesis of the neoclassical theory
by pointing out the failure of per capita output to equalize across first and third world 
economies as well as the failure of growth rates in less developed countries to exceed 
those of advanced industrialized countries. Research by Lant (1996) shows that the 
convergence has never occurred between rich and poor countries, in fact, exactly the 
opposite has occurred in some cases. In terms of theory, Bernard and Durlauf argued that 
a fundamental factor in growth is the presence of non-convexities in production that can 
create a non-diminishing relationship between an economy’s initial conditions and its 
output level over arbitrarily long horizons. Authors such as Azariadis and Drazen (1990) 
and Durlauf (1993) have specifically shown how production complementarities can 
interact with market incompleteness to generate multiple equilibria in long-term output 
paths, which implies that similarly specified economies need not converge.
The striking differences in the empirical implications of the neoclassical and new 
growth perspectives have led to a huge amount of literature to test the convergence 
hypothesis.
Two of the earliest and most influential studies of regional convergence was Borts 
and Stein’s (1964) classic study of regional development in the United States and 
Williamson’s (1965) analysis of the evolution of regional income differences in advanced 
industrial countries. The models of regional growth advanced by writers such as Perroux 
(1950, 1955), Myrdal (1957), and Kaldor (1970, 1981), however, predict that regional 
incomes will tend to diverge, because market forces, if left to their own devices, are 
spatially disequilibrating. Economies of scale and agglomeration lead to the cumulative 
concentration of capital, labor, and output in certain regions at the expense of others: 
uneven regional development is self-reinforcing rather than self-correcting.
The Marxist theories that have become popular among some geographers in the 
1970s and 1980s, on the other hand, challenged both of the above two views. These 
theories, suggested by the writings of Harvey (1982), Massey (1984), and Smith (1984), 
view regional economic evolution as neither convergent nor divergent, but rather as 
essentially episodic. The accumulation crises that from time to time punctuates the course 
of capitalist development promote the search for new capital, technological, and social 
“fixes” and lead to new configurations of regional relative growth and decline. Thus, in 
theory, it would be possible to observe regional convergence in one historical phase of 
regional development but divergent in another phase.
Since the mid-1980s, Marxist approaches have given way to neo-Marshallian and 
transactions cost theories of regional economic agglomeration and growth. However, 
these studies depicted a particular sort of region rather than understanding and charting 
the trajectories of a nation’s regional system as a whole. In other words, the emphasis 
remains firmly on the contingent conditions of growth in particular regions, rather than 
on the long-term evolution of the entire regional economic system.
While the study of the long-term evolution of regional systems is waning, interest 
in long-term economic growth has seen a revival among economist in the late 1980s. 
Languishing in the early 1960s, the study of long-term growth revived as economists 
renewed their interests in the empirics of growth, and especially in the evidence for long­
term convergence in per capita incomes and output between nations and national regions. 
The new studies have been treating factors as technological change and human capital as 
endogenous and formulating their new endogenous growth theory by using regional 
growth patterns to evaluate and develop their theory.
Over the past decade, empirical work by economists on cross-national and cross- 
regional convergence has proliferated, and a list of examples are Chatteiji (1992), Barro 
and Sala-i-Martin (1995), Canova and Marcet (1995), de la Feente (1995), Galor (1996) 
and Sala-i-Martin (1996). There have been also numerous attempts to measure the speed 
of convergence, for example, Baumol (1996), Romer (1986), Baumol and Wolff (1988), 
Doweich and Nguyen (1989), Barro (1991), Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992, 1995), 
Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992), etc. The general conclusion from these studies is that 
there is some support of absolute convergence only when attention is restricted to the set 
of richer countries, such as OECD countries.
Economic Theory of Convergence
The neoclassical growth model was originated with Solow (1956) aiming at 
interpreting the relationships between economic inputs, mainly capital and labor, and 
long run growth. The model treated technological and capital endowment as exogenous 
and implied that per capita output in an economy will converge to the same level 
regardless of initial technological and capital endowment. The logic behind the universal 
convergence is the law of diminishing return to capital and the automatic flow and 
mobility of labor and capital. Under free market system, labor and capital will 
automatically flow to where its marginal return is the highest. In the long run, higher 
growth economies tend to slow down while lower growth ones tends to catch up. New 
growth theory, however, suggest that due to different endowments in technology, human 
and physical capital, the convergence may not occur.
There are two concepts or measures of convergence. The so-called (3-convergence 
is said to exist if the regression coefficient, (3, of the growth rate of regional relative per 
capita income over a given period on the level of regional relative per capita income at 
the beginning of the period is negative. A negative value of (3 implies that there is a 
tendency for per capita incomes to equalize across economies and the value of [3 
measures the speed of convergence. A group of economies (countries or regions) is said 
to be characterized by so-called 8-convergence if the dispersion (variance) of their 
relative per capita income levels tends to decrease over time. The concept of 8- 
convergence can easily be shown to be closely related to that of absolute convergence. 
The existence of ^-convergence will tend to generate declining dispersion, or 8- 
convergence. However, 8-convergence also depends on the variance of error terms or 
“shocks” in the growth regression.
There have been two main developments in the basic convergence regression. The 
first is the idea of so-called “club convergence” -  which means only countries that are 
similar in their structural characteristics and that have similar initial conditions will 
converge to one another. Thus, the richer OECD countries may form one “convergence 
club”, the developing countries another, and the underdeveloped yet another. The broad 
inequalities among the different clubs may persist or even increase. The second has been 
the reformulation of the standard (3-convergence to test whether economies converge, not 
to a common steady state (equalization of incomes) but to their own long-term steady 
state (equilibrium) relative income level. This concept is also known as conditional 
convergence, which means that the convergence is conditional on the different structural 
characteristics of each economy, such as societal preferences, technologies, rate of
population growth, and government policy. The countries under one “convergence club” 
should also display a so-called absolute convergence.
In this context, the regional convergence within one country is expected to display 
an absolute convergence, as regions within a country are much more likely to share 
similar structural characteristics and behave like a “convergence club”. A lot of 
interesting studies have been done on the regional convergence within countries, such as 
Canadian provinces, Japanese prefectures, and U.S. states. Long term regional 
convergence, both j3-convergence and 5-convergence, has been identified and their 
convergence coefficients been calculated.
Next, we talk about the divergence theory that directly contradicts with the 
convergence hypothesis. The theory of income divergence assumes indivisible or lumpy 
inputs in some production functions, which leads to scale economies and to external or 
agglomeration economies and the resulting specialization of some places in production of 
certain traded goods or services. (Drennan, Tobier and Lewis, 1996) Such theory was 
based on the theory of scale economies of Ohlin (1933) and applied to convergence and 
divergence theories by Lucas (1988). There have been two models explaining the sources 
of income divergence, the models of growth and the models of trade. The models of 
growth are based on increasing returns in physical or human capital externalities, as 
advanced by Paul Romer and Robert Lucas respectively. In their models, regions with 
higher levels of physical or human capital can become even wealthier as increasing 
returns reinforce their initial advantages. The models of trade predict the possibility of 
income divergence through divergence in industrial structures. As high-tech, high-wage 
industries are subject to external economies, the opening up of trade will cause the
concentration of all the high-tech, high-wage industries in a few regions, while leaving 
the remaining regions with only the low-tech, low-wage industries.
Income and Output Change across Regions
We have two measures of per capita income or product across the U.S. states in 
different time intervals. The first is per capita personal income. The U.S. Commerce 
Department has published annual data on nominal personal income for the 48 continental 
states since 1929. Data available from the Commerce Department’s Bureau of Economic 
Analysis (BEA) is divided into two parts, 1929-1957 and 1959-1996. Our analysis is 
based on the latter half of the data. The second type of data is per capita Gross State 
Product (GSP). The main differences between personal income and GSP involve capital 
income. Personal income includes corporate net income only when individuals receive 
payment as dividends, whereas GSP includes corporate profits and depreciation. But 
neither of them includes capital gains. Typically, GSP attributes capital income to the 
state in which the business activity occurs, while personal income attributes it to the state 
of the asset holder (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1992).
The regional configuration is based on that of the BEA and distributed as follows. 
New England region includes six states, Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New 
Hampshire, Rode Island, and Vermont. Mid-East states include Delaware, District of 
Colombia, Maryland, New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania. Great Lakes includes 
five states, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, and Wisconsin. Plains include seven states, 
Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, and South Dakota.
Southeast include twelve states, Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, 
Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, and West 
Virginia. Southwest are four states, Arizona, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Texas. Rocky 
Mountain has five states, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Utah and Wyoming. The rest are six 
Far East states, Alaska, California, Hawaii, Nevada, Oregon, and Washington.
Table 1.
Per Capita PI Change
Regions 1958 1996 Annual
Grow
Increase
United States 2117 24426 0.0272 10.538
New England 2739 33875 0.0280 11.368
Mid-East 2520 26848 0.0263 9.654
Great Lakes 1801 21011 0.0274 10.666
Plains 2055 22917 0.0269 10.152
Southeast 1320 19977 0.0303 14.134
Southwest 1732 22470 0.0285 11.973
Rocky Mountain 2311 28989 0.0282 11.544
Far West 2008 22139 0.0267 10.025
The above Table 1 shows the regional per capita personal income change over 
time. The annual growth is calculated by taking the logarithm difference between per 
capita personal income in 1996 and in 1958 and them divided by total number of years, 
which is39. The increase index is calculated by taking the direct difference between the 
ending and initial years and divided by number of years. The two measures give different 
insight in the change of income over time. The figure shows, from 1958 to 1996, United 
States average per capita personal income increased by some ten folds from $2117 in
1958 to $24426 in 1996, with annual growth rate of 2.72%. In 1958, the two poorest 
regions are Southeast and Southwest, whose per capita personal incomes were 62% and 
81% of national average. While their annual growth rates were also the highest compared 
with other regions, with Southeast regions seeing an annual average growth of 3.03%, 
much higher than national average. Towards 1996, Southeast region raised its per capita 
personal income to 82% of national average, while southwest region raised its income to 
92% of national average. The narrowing gap shows that the southern region, with lower 
initial income level, has been quickly catching up in the past decades.
There have been a number of research studies on the fast economic growth pace 
of the southern states of the U.S. during the past century and after the World War II in 
particular. It should also be noted that the regional data is the aggregate of data for all 
states within that region and thus masks over any difference between states within that 
region. Actually, some of the southern states have developed so rapidly in the past 
decades that income for some of them has already surpassed national average.
Let’s look into states among regions. When we sort out personal income by states 
at the initial and ending year, we can see that at initial year of 1958, a higher percentage 
of the lowest income states were southern states, while in 1996, much smaller number of 
southern states are among the lowest income states. Actually, a number of southern states 
have become high-income states. This fact has aroused great interest among economist to 
explain the unevenness of the regional economic development over time.
Now, let’s look at the regional output. Table 2 shows the change of per capita 
Gross State Product (GSP) aggregated at regional level.
Table 2.
GSP Change ©wartime
1977 1994 Annual
Grow
Increase
United States 9017.35 26254.94 0.0258 1.9116
New England 7795.81 26390.54 0.0294 2.3852
Mid-East 11310.43 39476.08 0.0302 2.4902
Great Lakes 9261.29 25431.09 0.0244 1.7460
Plains 8581.71 24322.10 0.0251 1.8342
Southeast 7632.75 22795.92 0.0264 1.9866
Southwest 8655.31 23054.45 0.0236 1.6636
Rocky Mountain 9424.47 24578.03 0.0231 1.6079
Far West 11487.99 29659.30 0.0229 1.5818
The table is based on data published by the BEA. Current data is only available 
from the year 1977 on. The aggregate data shows some different results as we have 
witnessed in state per capita personal income. The south regions are not showing obvious 
higher growth rate than other regions. While higher income regions like New England 
and Mid-East had been growing at faster speed than other regions and national average. 
Such phenomenon has been noted by a lot of economist and there has been a lot of 
literature devoted to the research of the new growth pattern emerged at the end of 1970s. 
We will talk about it more in our later discussion.
We can also see that the Far West region, which has traditionally been a region 
with higher per capita output, continues to have slow annual growth rate. One 
explanation of the empirical evidence is that in the past two decades the region has seen
an increasing number of immigration from other states and from other countries and thus 
its income and output level is low when denominated by total population.
Income Change across Regions in a Continuous Time Series
We now turn to a detailed time-series analysis of the evolution in personal income 
level across U.S. regions. We are trying to follow the path of state income change in 
larger time interval. We only want to catch the relative income level of regions and the 
changing path over time. We thus calculate the relative personal income level for each 
region by dividing each year’s state per capita personal income by U.S. average, them we 
plot our the relative personal income in a whole time series.
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Figure 1.
The above figure is the regional per capita personal income relative to the U.S. in 
the time interval between 1958 and 1996. This gives us a direct view of regional personal 
income change and offers a direct test of convergence across regions. The figure clearly 
shows that per capita personal income for each had been converging to the United States 
average personal income prior to 1980. The higher income regions of New England, Mid- 
East and Rocky Mountain had seen a declining personal income relative to the U.S., 
while low income regions of Southeast, Southwest had been narrowing down their gap 
with the U.S. average. The middle income regions of Plains, Far West and Great Lakes 
had seen some fluctuations, but generally been also moving towards the U.S. average. At 
the end of 1970s, the income gap across regions dropped to the lowest.
It has been observed that at the end of 1970s, the income gap among regions 
dropped to the lowest and started to disperse again, until the year 1990, the income gap 
among regions had expanded to a level that was almost equal to that in 1960s. The 
general impression is that convergence had been prevalent before 1980, while in the 
1980s personal income showed divergence. However, the economic literature has largely 
exaggerated the so-called divergence evidence. Some economists even stated that the era 
of convergence had gone forever and there came the time of divergence, which is a clear 
pattern displayed in income change at international level. When we observe the data 
closely, however, we can still see that such divergence was not really as prevalent as 
some economists had described. Lower income regions had actually been continued to 
catch up and are approaching closer to the national average. Also some higher income 
regions, such as New England, have widened their income gap with the U.S. average and
lower-income regions. It’s also obvious that after the 1980s, regional income 
convergence again resumed.
A number of studies have shown that the fast income growth of the New England 
and a few other states in the Northeast Census Region actually contributed most to 
regional income dispersion in 1980s. Wheelock and Coughlin (1993) found that the 
divergence was due primarily to strength in the high technology and producer services 
industries of the region. Several researchers have attempted to determine why New 
England states fared so well during the 1980s, with some placing the 1980s boom in the 
context of the subsequent deep, prolonged recession. Consistent with Wheelock and 
Coughlin’s findings, these explanation typically focus on the booming defense, high-tech, 
finances, and real estate sectors. Henderson (1990) found that a surge in defense-related 
activities coincided with the Massachusetts boom in this period. Rosen and Wenninger 
(1994) pointed out that there is a strong correlation between total revenues of registered 
securities dealers and New York State income.
8-Convergence Testing
The concept of 8-convergence can be defined as follows: a group of economies 
are converging in the sense of 8 if the dispersion of their per capita income levels tends to 
decrease over time (Sala-i-Martin, 1991). It is defined mathematical as if
St+T < 8t
where 8t is the time t standard deviation of the logarithm of states per capital personal 
income for each year from 1958 to 1996.
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Figure two shows that the dispersion of per capita personal income across U.S. 
states had been declining over time. Again, the date of 1980s shows an actual increase in 
such dispersion, but the decrease trend came back in the 1990s. In a longer time interval, 
such decrease in income dispersion has been the prevalent trend. In another word, 8- 
convergence is evident.
Historically, there have been two upward trends in such dispersion, one in 1920s 
and one in 1980s. The 1920s’ rise income dispersion reflects the adverse shock to 
agriculture. Because the agricultural states were already below national average in per 
capita income before the shock, the effect of such shock was pronounced. (Barro, 1991)
Barro thus concluded that the rise in income dispersion in 1980s were also caused by a 
negative shock, which he cited as the plunge in oil price.
(3-Cdivergence Testing
As we have discussed at the beginning, regional economy within a national 
country is more likely to display long-term absolute (3-convergence, which means the 
regression co-efficient (3 of income growth over initial level of income is negative.
We will use the following simple model to test (3-convergence:
PIGRi = a  + (3 * PIi0 
where PIGRi is the rate of growth of state i per capita personal income over time, 
which is attained by the log different between the end year and initial year personal 
income then divide it by the number of years. And PIi0 is logarithm form of state Vs per 
capita personal income in an initial year. The regression coefficient (3 will be less than 0 
if (3-convergence exists.
Here we divide our data set into sub data sets and run regression on them 
separately to get different coefficients. The sub data sets are in the following time 
interval, 1929-1957, 1958-1967, 1968-1977,1978-1987, 1988-1996, and 1929-1996. And 
we run regression on income growth over initial income level and get the following 
figure.
Table 5.
Regression Coefficients on Initial Income
1929-1957
1958-1967
Coefficient Standard t-Statistics
Estimates Error
-0.0323 0.00434 -7.425
-0.0028 0.00524 -0.535
1968-1977 -0.0061 0.00657 -0.092
1978-1987 0.0300 0.00712 4.221
1988-1996 -0.0147 0.00455 -3.231
1929-1996 -0.0146 0.00075 -19.431
Now, let have a close examination of the rate of convergence.
According to Barro, the rate of convergence, or the convergence coefficient (3, 
depends on the productivity of capital and the willingness to save. In particular, the 
source of convergence in the neoclassical growth model is the assumed diminishing 
returns to capital, that is, the marginal product to capital tends to rise over time when the 
ratio of capital (and thus output) to labor in a certain area is low (or say that is below the 
steady-state ratio). The p coefficient for the sample from 1880 to 1988 is calculated to be 
some 0.0175, or in the neighborhood of 2 percent a year. Our regression found a higher p 
for time period from 1929 to 1957, 0.0323, or some 3 percent annually. But the 
coefficients dropped to below 1 percent in sixties and seventies and it is actually not 
highly significant statistically, implying convergence fluctuate somewhat. While in 
1980s, the P coefficient was a positive 0.03, meaning state personal income actually 
diverged by 3 percent annually. The coefficient is highly significant statistically and thus 
strengthens the hypothesis that income stopped to converge in 1980s.
However, when we do regression on larger time interval, from 1929 to 1996, the 
short-term noise has been smoothed out. The (3 coefficient is a highly significant 0.0146, 
or some 1.5 percent annually, which is close to Barro’s empirical finding.
1980s: Short Term Divergence?
Researchers generally agree that incomes diverged between 1979 and 1988, but 
there is no consensus about what caused the divergence.
One major speculation about the reason for increased dispersion during the 1980s 
focuses on the role of oil prices falling. Researches of such noted economists as Barro 
and Sala-i-Martin (1991) and Carlino (1992) have all cited the oil price plunge as an 
explanation. This hypothesis is based on the observation that relative incomes in oil 
producing states, which tends to have low income, fell substantially during 1980s. 
Coughlin and Mandelbaum (1988) found that the oil price decline was among the most 
important factors explaining the divergence. However, when closely examining the 
timing of oil price change and the timing of the divergence, such explanation is not 
consistent with the observed evidence. (Carolyn Sherwood-Call, 1996).
Oil prices actually rose sharply in 1980. Given the generally low incomes in 
energy-producing states, such increase in oil price was supposed to contribute to an 
accelerating income convergence. But the fact is incomes diverged across states in the 
early 1980s. The collapse in oil price, which had been credited with generating the 
divergence, did not occur until 1982, which was four years after the divergence began. 
Another fact is that in the mid-1970s, there was a sharp rise in oil prices, however, such
rise was not followed by an accelerating convergence in income. An analysis shows that 
when energy-producing states are omitted from the sample, diverging trend still persisted 
through most of the 1980s.
In evaluating the divergence in 1980s, three contradictory thoughts prevail the 
economic literature. One views the increased income dispersion during the 1980s as a 
anomaly that temporarily departed from the long-run convergence trend evident for most 
of this century. In this case, the forces that might be expected to cause convergence 
continued to work throughout the 1980s, but they were offset for a time by a large shock 
(or a set of shocks) that took some years to dissipate.
The second school of thoughts argues that the 1980s divergence may represent a 
fundamental change in the long-term downward trend in income dispersion. In other 
words, there is possibility that incomes have stopped converging ever since. This could 
occur when each state has approached its long-term steady-state income level, thus 8 is 
near its minimum level and p is close to zero. In this case, convergence or divergence 
could be expected only in short-term when temporary shocks pull states away from their 
steady-state income, or change their steady states.
The third school of thoughts suggest that income may be diverging now, as 
argued by Lucus (1988), because of agglomeration economies. Lucas argument suggests 
that agglomeration economies make the returns to workers who have accumulated 
substantial human capital higher in regions where there are other workers rich in human 
capital. That’s to say that workers rich in human capital have the incentive to migrate to 
regions with large concentrations of like workers. If this hypothesis holds, income 
difference across regions will get more and more pronounced over time and divergence
trend would dominate. Such hypothesis seems not consistent with the empirical evidence 
of the income convergence during the long period of time in the U.S.
A study of Drennan and Tobier used industry data of major cities in their analysis 
and yielded interesting result. Their analysis was based on the comparison of servicing 
and manufacturing data across 51 largest US cities over the 1980s. They found that cities 
more specialized in producer services at the beginning of the decade had much better 
growth than cities more specialized in manufacturing. Thus they concluded that it was the 
regional specialization in producer services in 1980s that contributed to upward 
divergence of regional average income. And because producer services are concentrated 
in cities, the growth of median household income in cities is the most important factor to 
the regional income change of the decade.
State Price Index Considered
Barro pointed out the importance of price index in analyzing state personal 
income. Most studies have deflated the nominal income for each state by the national 
index for consumer prices, due to the lack of useful measures of price levels or price 
indexes for individual state. As the same price deflator was used for each state, the 
deflator actually only affect the constant terms in regression. Two potential measurement 
errors occur, as cited by Barro. First, if relative purchasing power parity does not hold 
across the states, then the growth rates of real per capita income are mismeasured. 
Second, if absolute purchasing power parity does not hold, then the levels of per capita 
income are mismeasured.
The problem has been noted by a number of economists, who argued that failure 
to correct the date on state personal income for interstate differences in price levels 
actually exaggerated the variation among states. Specially, it exaggerated the divergence 
trend of state personal income in 1980s. Studies using price index corrected income data 
greatly smoothed out the interstate income dispersion over time. Some even concluded 
that when corrected by state price indexes, convergence trend persisted in 1980s.
Data on state price levels are not available for the longer time period of time. And 
direct calculation of state price or cost-of-living indexes is not possible because no 
organized effort exists to collect the data necessary for such calculation. So far, price 
indexes come from three individual studies, McMahon and Melton 1978, Fournier and 
Rasmussen 1986, and McMahon 1991. McMahon and Melton estimate a state cost-of- 
living index for 1977, and Fournier and Rasmussen provide such an estimate for 1980. 
McMahon’s study provides a state cost-of-living index for the 10-year period from 1981 
to 1990. The three studies differ in some respects (detail not discussed in this paper, 
please refer to individual studies for detail), but the estimated values for the state cost-of- 
living indexes are strongly correlated across years.
We have tested our data by using the above price index and yield substantially 
different result as we previously got. However, the lack of continuous time-series of price 
index greatly restricted our studies towards a consistently convincing result.
The figure 3 is a comparison of state per capita personal income dispersion in 
1980s before and after adjusted by state price indexes.
Figure 3.
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The immediate impression at examining the figure is that the dispersion of per 
capita personal income across states, represented by the standard deviation of the 
logarithm form of state per capita personal income, declined by a considerable amount 
when corrected by state price index. This empirical evidence is consistent with the 
assumption make by such economist as Barro. When we plotted the price-adjusted 
personal income of ten lower income states and ten high-income states from 1980 to 
1990, the dominant trend of convergence reappeared. The income gap between ten lower 
income states and higher income states continued to narrow down in 1980s. However, as 
it can be observed from Figure 3, although total amount of dispersion dropped 
considerably after price index adjustment, the general trend of the 1980s, which shows 
increasing income dispersion, was not thus reversed. From this point of view, price level 
adjustment can reduce the exaggerated income dispersion across states, but it cannot 
totally explain the upward trend of income dispersion in 1980s.
Experience shows that price index adjustment greatly reduced income biasedness 
across states. However, due to the lack of a longer time-series price index data, a 
comprehensive analysis of state real income and real output is still not possible.
Multiple-Variable Regression and Growth Determinants
The above analysis suggests that income change across states does fluctuate and 
convergence and divergence interact with each other in a large extend. Though income 
convergence is the long historical trend, such convergence is far from being guided by 
some automatic mechanism. On the contrary, there are some other factors, as suggested 
by endogenous growth theorists, that have been knit closely into the long-term economic 
growth across regions.
Now we are trying to identify some of these endogenous growth attributes and to 
run regression on them in order to catch a quantitative measure of their effects on income 
growth. The model is based on some empirical evidence showing significant correlation 
between per capita income growth and the explanatory variables.
The model is as follows:
PCPI = INIPI + SCHOOL + EDUEXP + POPDENS + POP65
+ POPMETRO + CRIME + TAX + EMP + NORTHEAST
Here, the dependent variable is PCPI, the average growth of per capita personal 
income over time. It is calculated by subtracting the logarithm of per capita personal 
income in the beginning year from the logarithm of per capita income in the ending year, 
then divides it by the total number of years in between. For an accurate measure, we use
the average per capita personal income in five years as the initial and the ending personal 
income level.
There are ten explanatory variables at the right side of the equation. INIPI is the 
initial per capita personal income, obtained by average up the per capita personal income 
of the five years between 1958 and 1962. The variable takes a logarithm form and is 
expected to have a negative sign. SCHOOL is the percentage of population with above 
higher school education. The variable is in percentage number and is expected to have a 
positive sign. EDUEXP is the per capita education expense by state and local 
governments. The variable is in logarithm form and is expected to have a positive sign. 
POPDENS is the population density, measured by the number of people per square mile 
of land. The variable is used in logarithm form also and its sign cannot be decided 
theoretically. High population density may imply rich in human capital and may 
contribute to future high growth, while it can also means the high clustering of poor 
population, which constitutes a drag force behind growth. POP65 is the percentage of 
population over 65 years old. The sign is expected to be negative, as large portion of 
elder population is generally regarded as a non-productive force. POPMETRO is the 
percentage of population living in metropolitan areas. It is also in logarithm form and its 
sign cannot be decided in theory. Just as population density, high metropolitan population 
density may be a symbol of fast process of urbanization, while also come with are cluster 
of poor black population, high crime rate and high burden to local government. CRIME is 
the crime rate, measured by the number of crimes per million of population. It is in 
logarithm form and is expected to have a negative sign. TAX is the tax rate, calculated as 
the ratio of state and local general revenue from own source to state total personal
income. It is expected to have a negative sign. EMP is the employment ratio, calculated 
by the total employment divided by the total population. Its sign is not easy to decide. 
Theoretically, high employment ratio may yield high growth. We also used one dummy 
variable NORTHEAST, which takes value of 1 for northeast states and value of 0 for the 
rest of the country. It is expected to have a positive sign, as the higher growth rate of 
northeastern states has been noted by a lot of economists.
The table 4 shows the regression results on per capita personal income. The total 
R-square is 0.44, which is not high enough. But given only 51 observation on the 
regression, it’s normally difficult to get a high R-square, thus the accuracy of regression 
coefficients has to be compromised somewhat. The ten variables generally yield their 
expected signs and their implications give us some inspiration as to what caused high 
growth to states.
Table 4.
Regression on Personal Income
Variables Parameters
Estimate
Standard
Error
T for HO: 
Parameter
INTERCEP
INIPI
SCHOOL
POPDENS
POP65
POPMETRO
CRIME
TAX
EDUEXP
EMP
NORTHEST
0.095686
-0.005264
3.128869
0.000005
-0.017532
-0.001286
- 0.000012
-0.022564
0.000333
-0.013648
0.000801
0.014131
0.001632
5.551487
0.000340
0.015899
0.001053
0.000983
0.022051
0.002191
0.008168
0.000775
6.771
-3.226
0.564
0.014
-1.103
- 1.221
- 0.012
-1.023
0.152
-1.671
1.033
The INIPI, initial per capita personal income, has a positive sign and is highly 
significant. It once again confirms the convergence hypothesis that lower income states 
tends to growth faster and narrow their income gap with higher income states. Barro’s 
study on a whole period between 1880 and 1988 showed that regression coefficient of 
initial income on income growth is between 1 to 2 percent, which is low-income states 
tend to narrow their gap with high-income states by 1-2 percent annually. Our regression 
yields a much lower coefficient, some 0.5 percent annually. The lower catch-up rate is 
firstly due to a shorter time interval. Secondly, it is largely disturbed by the slower 
convergence rate in 1970s and the actual divergence trend in 1980s. Still, the coefficient 
strengthens the long-term convergence hypothesis.
The SCHOOL variable yielded a positive sign, showing it is positively correlated 
with income growth. It is measured by percentage of population with above high school 
education, which is an effective measure of human capital endowment for a given state. 
New growth theories have treated human capital as one of the most important long-term 
attributes to higher growth. Our regression confirms such hypothesis. Another measure of 
human capital endowment is the education expense, EDUEXP, which measures the 
amount of money that state and local governments put into education. It is also positively 
related to income growth, as such education expense will turn into long-term human 
capital competence for states. Here, EDUEXP variable has lower significant level. The 
reason may be that SCHOOL and EDUEXP are correlated with each other and thus 
disturbed our coefficient estimates. The Pearson Correlation Coefficient for the two 
variables is 0.64. When regression is run on the two variables separately, both of them 
yield highly significant coefficients.
Now, we turn to population measures. Population density has a positive sign, 
which tells that the increase of population in a given state raises growth rate, while high 
population in metropolitan areas has a negative effect on income growth. This finding is 
consistent with theoretical studies in the field. In most of the big cities in the U.S., high 
population density is caused by a cluster of poor black population, who is always low 
educated and large portion of it depends on state welfare. It’s a negative force behind 
state income growth over time. The portion of population over 65 year old is also 
calculated as a negative force behind income growth, and the negative coefficient is 
consistent with theoretical observation.
Tax rate is one of the most significant single endogenous growth attributes cited 
by new growth theorists. There has been much economic literature devoted to the study 
of the influences of tax rate on long-term growth. Theoretically, taxes raise the cost or 
lower the return s to a taxed activity. Taxes therefore create incentives for individuals or 
businesses to seek out activities that minimize their tax payments. (Zsolt, 1996) Some 
also argue, in the contrary, that higher taxes may stimulate economy activity if used to 
finance appropriate expenditure rather than finance welfare transfers. (Helms, 1985) Our 
empirical findings support a negative correlation between tax rate and income growth.
Crime rate is expected to be negatively related to income growth, but its 
theoretical base is not clear. High crime rate may actually be caused by fast growth, 
which attract large number of immigrants and floating population. Our regression yield a 
negative coefficient for crime variable, but it’s not statistically significant. The 
insignificance may be caused by some correlation between crime variable and other 
variables such as population density and metropolitan population. The Pearson
Correlation Coefficient is 0.28 for crime rate and population density and 0.75 for crime 
rate and metropolitan population. The latter is high enough to cause biasedness in our 
coefficient estimates.
The employment ratio is a variable that cannot be justified by economic theories. 
We expect to have a positive sign on the coefficient, as high number of employment 
relative to the total population is expected to contribute to income growth. However, our 
regression yields a negative coefficient that is significant at 10 percent confidence level. 
A reasonable explanation is that employment ratio does not work the same way as 
unemployment rate. While low employment ratio does not mean high unemployment 
rate, which normally does harm to economic growth, high employment ratio may actually 
implies a clustering of low-tech, low-wage jobs, which is a clear sign of low income 
growth. It’s thus possible that high-income states tend to have low employment ratio 
against their total population.
Finally, we examine our only dummy variable, the Northeast states. Originally, I 
put South states as a dummy but yielded a consistently insignificant coefficient. Although 
economists have speculated the higher growth rate for southern states, our empirical 
finding does not support such hypothesis. On the other hand, it shows that it is 
northeastern states that have developing faster than national average. The coefficient here 
is not highly significant, however, when I ran another series of regressions by taking 
away some multiple correlation between variables, the northeast dummy got all highly 
significant. This finding is consistent with our observation in the previous sections of this 
paper, especially that in 1980s the northeast states had been grown with unusually high 
rate and their per capita income well surpassed national level.
Summary and Conclusion
Mainstream economic theories have supported the convergence hypothesis. Our 
empirical studies yield a result that is consistent with the hypothesis. Convergence has 
been the major trend of U.S. state income growth in the past decades, while at the same 
time, there is some divergence trend emerging under special economic conditions, 
namely, the structural change across U.S. states in 1980s contribute to a short-term 
income divergence. While convergence being the dominant trend in the time interval we 
have studied, the convergence has not been realized in an automatic mechanism. Rather, 
there have been a number of attributes that caused such convergence. The attributes are 
mainly technology and human capital measures.
Notes and Additional Information
State Price Index is an important concept and deserves some more explanation. 
Further research on the topic will be both worthwhile and fruitful.
All the three studies we mentioned in this paper used the cost-of-living index, 
calculated by the Bureau of Labor Statistics for a sample of standard metropolitan 
statistical areas (SMSAs), to project these to state cost-of-living indexes. The projections 
were performed by using a set of independent variables to explain the inter-SMSA 
variations in cost of living. The coefficients found for these variables were applied to
state data to get the estimated state cost-of-living index. McMahon (1991) described the 
selection of variables in this way:
“Attention is confined to those explanatory variables that have a logical 
relationship to the cost of living within each of the SMS As because as much as stability 
as possible in their predictive capability is sought, and also to variables for which data are 
available on an annual statewide basis for 1981-1991. For these reasons there are some 
differences in the explanatory variables from those used by the Fournier and Rasmussen 
analysis as well as in the original McMahon-Melton estimates for 1997.”
Cost of living disperses among states and fluctuates over time. For example, in 
California, the cost-of-living index had risen from 103.4 in 1980 to 119.0 in 1990. In 
Arizona, however, the cost-of-living index had fallen from 97.7 in 1980 to 89.5 in 1990. 
Note that the only direct comparison here is that living in California was more expensive 
than in Arizona by about 5.7% in 1980 and by almost 30% in 1990. Indirectly, it is 
possible to conclude that the rate of inflation in California was above the national 
average, whereas in Arizona, it was below the national average. We cannot conclude, 
however, that the absolute cost of living (or the general price level) in Arizona had 
decreased over this time.
Reference
■ “The Classical Approach to Convergence Analysis,” Xavier X. Sala-i-Matin, The 
Economic journal, July 1996, pg. 1019-1036.
S “Convergence,” Robert J. Barro, Xavier Sala-i-Matin, Journal o f Political Economy, 
1992, Vol. 100, No.2, pg. 223.
■ “Convergence across States and Regions,” Robert J. Barro, Xavier Sala-i-Martin, 
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1991.
■ “Convergence in State Nominal and Real Per Capita Income: Empirical Evidence,” 
Oded IzraeliKevin Murphy, Public Finance Review, November 1997.
■ “Economic Growth in the American States: The End of Convergence?” John B. 
Crihfield, J. Fred Giertz and Shekhar Mehta, The Quarterly Review of Economics and 
Fiance, Vol. 35, Special 1995, pg. 551-577.
■ “Economic Integration and Convergence: U.S. Regions, 1840-1987,” Sukkoo Kim, 
The Journal o f Economic History, Vol. 58, No. 3, September 1998.
■ “An Empirical Investigation of Forces Influencing Productivity and the Rate of 
Convergence among States,” Rubina Vohra, Atlantic Economic Journal, December 
1997, No.4, Vol. 25, pg.412.
■ “Forget Convergence: Divergence Past, Present, and Future,” Lant Pritchett, Finance 
& Development, Washington, Hune 1996.
■ “How Fast do We Grow?” Rubina Vohira, Growth and Change, Vol. 27, Winter 
1996, pg. 47-54.
H “The Interruption of Income convergence and Income Growth in Large Cities in the 
1980s,” Matthew P. Drennan, Emanuel Tobier and Jonathan Lewis, Urban Studies, 
Vol. 33, No. 1, 1996, pg 63-83.
■ “Interpreting Tests of the Convergence Hypothesis,” Andrew B. Bernard, Steven N. 
Durlauf, Journal o f Econometrics, 71 (1996), pg.161-173.
■ “The 1980s Divergence in State Per Capita Incomes: What does it Tell Us?” Carolyn 
Sherwood-Call, Economic Review -  Federal Reserve Bank o f San Francisco, 1996.
■ “Slow Convergence? The New Endogenous Growth Theory and Regional 
Development,” Ron Martin, Peter Sunley, Economic Geography, No. 3, Vol. 74, pg. 
201.
■ “Do State and Local Taxes Affect Relative State Growth?” Zsolt Becsi, Economic 
Review -  Federal Reserve Bank o f Atlanta, mar/Apr 1996.
■ “Technology and Convergence,” Andrew B. Bernard and Charles I. Jones, The 
Economic Journal, July 1996, pg. 1037-1044.
STATES 1980 1981 1982 1983
United States 10062 11144 11729 12384
Alabama 11627 12614 12745 13179
Alaska 10864 12047 12881 13695
Arizona 7856 9108 9537 9781
Arkansas 9917 11073 11872 13048
California 10219 11144 11569 12189
Colorado 9955 11039 11760 12616
Connecticut 7738 8528 8950 9519
Delaware 10616 11658 12449 13206
District of Columbia 12412 13544 14583 15316
Florida 11777 13072 14018 15119
Georgia 8253 9171 9704 10088
Hawaii 9512 10709 11250 11722
Idaho 10788 11794 12272 12949
Illinois 9330 10207 10512 11022
Indiana 9490 10788 11004 11232
Iowa 10926 12101 12899 13883
Kansas 10780 11978 12964 14046
Kentucky 11043 12298 13210 14075
Louisiana 8092 9003 9452 10191
Maine 13843 15524 17315 17981
Maryland 9959 11085 11649 12525
Massachusetts 9360 10376 10599 11309
Michigan 9936 11170 11913 12286
Minnesota 10298 11061 11370 12167
Mississippi 7765 10049 10694 11079
Missouri 10158 11142 11785 12333
Montana 8056 8665 9076 9433
Nebraska 6938 7731 8093 8388
Nevada 9304 10316 10906 11716
New Hampshire 7484 8429 8777 9285
New Jersey 8433 9364 9958 10764
New Mexico 8147 8990 9433 10021
New York 10916 11630 12133 13052
North Carolina 9893 10759 11221 11877
North Dakota 9369 10445 11006 11676
Ohio 8115 9014 9466 9714
Oklahoma 9937 11355 11909 12223
Oregon 7822 8657 9082 9530
Pennsylvania 8576 9245 9456 10134
Rhode Island 11831 12986 13556 14288
South Carolina 9460 10848 11630 11534
South Dakota 8805 9870 10297 10643
Tennessee 9963 10595 10784 11470
Texas 8019 8790 9190 9597
Utah 9899 10715 11240 11820
Vermont 10747 12080 12860 13491
Virginia 10031 11036 11680 12228
Washington 9437 10773 11337 11619
West Virginia 9685 10735 11493 12323
Wisconsin 8782 9969 10456 10743
Wyoming 11489 12573 12641 12391
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
14448 15185 15990 17062 18172 19191
14958 15715 16469 17713 19104 20242
16109 17148 18258 19740 21118 22344
11448 12048 12699 13183 14033 15490
15891 17136 18422 19764 20584 20768
14278 15036 15762 16762 17838 18750
14945 15914 16929 18088 19263 20054
11153 11777 12420 13303 14278 15233
15520 16393 17500 18919 20596 21649
17599 18469 19636 21822 23469 25700
17861 19014 20457 22336 23778 24988
11617 11874 12286 12878 13628 14497
13771 14446 15188 15792 16874 17830
14467 15316 15984 16908 18231 19637
12870 13568 14356 15249 16310 17192
13066 13741 14535 14888 16060 16896
16497 17549 18715 20105 21490 22517
16892 18202 19658 21447 22657 23249
16663 17811 18927 20463 21844 23146
12166 12961 13752 14828 15840 16673
18930 18497 18043 18452 19973 21089
14442 15256 16089 17137 18440 19185
13323 14069 14682 15272 15939 16640
14142 14756 15362 16058 16814 17963
14575 15411 15942 16973 18005 18731
12308 12642 13047 12138 13662 15262
14789 15594 16518 17134 18418 19374
10665 11215 11658 12412 13159 14194
9565 9930 10506 11250 12008 12724
13787 14633 15505 16616 17746 18652
10940 11452 11867 12652 13366 14045
12958 13823 14594 15611 16482 17411
11890 12667 13508 14496 15449 16327
14527 15394 16302 17836 19413 21563
13878 14533 15199 16210 17221 18147
13774 14461 15131 15934 16981 17672
11301 11759 12469 13201 14215 15105
14004 14024 14296 15134 16122 17310
11147 11734 12448 13308 14252 15128
11354 11708 12292 13122 14294 15366
16564 17339 18223 19287 20245 21413
12916 12963 13094 13848 14703 15634
11483 12160 12647 12962 14197 15053
13095 13723 14319 15331 16401 17448
11037 11424 11886 12461 13246 14230
13620 14358 15060 15828 16843 17721
15260 15645 16190 17008 18128 19323
14147 14936 15817 16954 18286 19410
13245 13307 13565 14389 15311 16430
14443 15415 16460 17925 19203 19728
11900 11846 12036 12844 13633 14800
13709 13530 13631 14347 15562 17220
1984
13588
14117
15083
11116
14542
13451
13944
10425
14321
16651
16704
10865
13023
13760
12212
12466
15299
15726
15638
11375
18087
13510
12394
13426
13476
11872
13991
10168
9133
12872
10274
12045
11131
13754
13093
12876
10843
13237
10527
10789
15611
12385
11225
12422
10436
12957
14617
13218
12560
13558
11436
13007
Per Capita Personal Income Change
Regions 1958 1996 Annual Growth Percent Increase
United States 2117 24426
New England 2739 33875
Mideast 2520 26848
Great Lakes 1801 21011
Plains 2055 22917
Southeast 1320 19977
Southwest 1732 22470
Rocky Mountain 2311 28989
Far West 2008 22139
0.0272 10.538 1 1
0.0280 11.368 1.293812 1.386842
0.0263 9.654 1.190364 1.099157
0.0274 10.666 0.850732 0.86019
0.0269 10.152 0.970713 0.938222
0.0303 14.134 0.623524 0.817858
0.0285 11.973 0.818139 0.919921
0.0282 11.544 1.091639 1.186809
0.0267 10.025 0.948512 0.90637
State Price Index by three Separate Studies
States 1977 1980 1981 1982 1983
Alabama 92.6 90.9 94.36 94.6 94.85
Alaska 121.66 119.08 115.52
Arizona 105.4 97.9 93.82 93.8 93.89
Arkansas 90.9 89.9 93.36 93.9 94.05
California 114.6 103.4 110.86 110.68 110.46
Colorado 106.9 99.5 101.26 101.66 101.47
Connecticut 127.8 110.9 111.6 112.21 113.44
Delaware 118.1 105.2 104.88 104.92 103.8
District of Columbia 111.2 120.53 120.61 120.14
Florida 98 92.7 95.29 93.77 95.49
Georgia 96.2 92.4 95.49 95.8 96.2
Hawaii 114.42 112.54 112.77
Idaho 102.5 95.6 90.74 90.7 91.96
Indiana 102.4 97.9 99.21 98.94 99.1
Iowa 101.6 100.6 101.6 100.84 99.74
Kansas 99.7 99.6 99.44 101.5 93.32
Kentucky 100.6 91.1 93.03 94.68 93.96
Illinois 109.5 102.3 105.17 105.2 104.95
Louisiana 95.8 92.5 97.81 97.75 96.88
Maine 97.6 102 95.71 95.85 96.99
Maryland 120.4 109.2 104.92 106.14 106.33
Massachusetts 114.5 108.8 107.11 107.67 107.59
Michigan 107.1 101 100.84 100.63 101.11
Minnesota 107.2 103.1 104.03 104.2 103.85
Mississippi 91.1 90.9 93.3 93.46 95.08
Missouri 102.6 97.4 100.27 100.81 100.67
Montana 102.8 98.1 96.43 96.04 95.5
Nebraska 101.3 101.3 101.08 100.66 99.6
Nevada 113.6 100.5 92.96 93.06 94.5
New Hampshire 113.3 104.8 96.14 97.14 93.34
New Jersey 124 109.9 108.69 109.13 110.83
New Mexico 101.1 95.5 95.66 95.83 94.18
New York 117.4 113.5 106.47 106.39 106.95
North Carolina 93.9 91.1 98.12 98.4 98.71
North Dakota 103.5 100.9 98.96 97.98 96.63
Ohio 106.4 99.6 101.59 101.76 101.84
Oklahoma 91.2 91.6 97.21 96.72 94.14
Oregon 104.3 99.3 95.22 96.27 98.23
Pennsylvania 101.2 103.3 103.06 102.96 102.36
Rhode Island 110.1 105.1 101.25 101.52 102.32
South Carolina 94 90.8 92.85 93.09 93.48
South Dakota 99.7 99 98 97.27 95.97
Tennessee 93.2 91.2 94.55 93.37 95.7
Texas 93 92 96.38 96.3 95.05
Utah 105.1 96.4 90.92 88.98 88.99
Vermont 107.6 104.9 93.72 95.62 96.05
Virginia 99.7 93 101.31 101.85 103.42
Washington 108.6 98.9 97.27 97.85 99.39
West Virginia 90.6 91.3 94.12 94.83 94
Wisconsin 106 102 100.81 100.98 100.79
Wyoming 104.4 102.3 90.51 90.03 90.01
United States 100 100 100 100 100
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
94.43 93.35 92.87 91.73 90.67 90.51 89.8
109.68 108.32 107.27 110.54 118.29 125.46 131.15
94.85 94.4 93.42 92.24 90.95 89.89 89.5
93.79 93.81 92.56 90.51 89.32 88.88 88.68
110.11 110.86 110.96 111.48 115.22 118.14 119.01
102.43 101.9 101.47 101.01 100.15 100.08 99.99
114.92 116.7 120.92 125.25 126.85 125.98 122.89
105.73 106.02 106.55 109.37 109.12 108.11 107.91
118.62 117.59 113.73 118.35 121.11 123.27 122.86
93.48 96.14 93.65 94.9 94.34 94.39 94.91
96.66 95.96 95.98 95.13 94.33 94.2 92.16
111.39 114.2 114.86 115.59 120.04 127.44 136.17
91.56 90.81 90.32 90.22 89.78 89.18 89.85
98.81 98.14 97.71 96.63 93.69 93.67 95.41
99.48 98.82 98.79 97.15 95.39 94.98 95.3
100.49 99.62 99.61 99.26 98.12 97.12 95.83
94.16 93.22 94.63 94.16 93.84 92.18 91.63
104.62 103.86 103.41 102.45 102.7 102.49 102.6
96.37 95.93 93.59 92.19 91.84 90.97 91.03
97.14 97.44 100.17 101.89 102.75 103.33 101.2
106.13 106.48 105.49 105.45 105.57 106.25 106.07
110.28 113.23 116.61 118.85 120.34 119.87 118.03
101.33 101.5 100.94 99.31 98.36 97.89 97.91
104.22 103.81 103.17 102.12 100.98 100.27 99.93
94.31 93.07 91.14 89.62 88.54 87.51 96.53
100.6 100.57 100.01 98.66 97.89 96.89 96.16
94.06 91.91 92.12 91.95 91.44 91.34 91.74
99.13 95.02 98.85 98.02 96.53 95.13 94.16
96.63 97.68 98.12 96.88 93.61 95.2 96.72
102.1 102.18 104.52 106.22 107.7 105.93 103.57
112.08 113.32 115.11 119.2 121.17 121.07 120.69
93.51 93.53 92.53 91.52 90.63 90.09 89.91
107.27 108.19 109.16 110.02 111.26 111.53 111.34
98.46 98.12 98.18 98.22 96.87 97.25 97.02
95.37 94.36 94.26 93.5 91.72 92.22 91.47
101.25 100.62 99.85 98.39 97.31 96.86 96.73
94.47 94.65 93.64 93.76 93.93 92.91 92.99
99.02 98.74 97.77 96.25 95.07 94.16 95.4
101.86 102.06 101.96 101.78 101.3 100.75 100.18
102.44 102.15 104.22 108.08 108.58 107.52 106.91
93.18 92.89 92.44 91.23 90.09 89.65 89.81
95.01 93.57 93.26 91.97 89.83 89.94 89.91
96.12 95.67 94.9 94.27 93.62 92.91 91.81
95.62 93.66 94.12 93.62 94.19 93.81 94.01
89.67 90.41 90.13 89.66 89.15 88.83 88.21
96 97.44 100.17 101.85 102.91 102.72 101.32
103.92 104.83 106.61 109.66 110.31 109.38 108.61
100.03 99.98 99.56 97.97 96.76 97.43 99.33
93.28 92.93 92.45 91.55 91.21 91.69 91.76
100.64 100.04 99.23 97.84 96.46 97.78 97.31
92.13 94.28 94.14 95.1 96.55 94.83 95.14
100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Regression State 
STATES Northeast 
Alabama 
Alaska 
Arizona 
Arkansas 
California 
Colorado 
Connectic 
Delaware 
Florida 
Georgia 
Hawaii 
Idaho 
Illinois 
Indiana 
Iowa 
Kansas 
Kentucky 
Louisiana 
Maine 
Maryland 
Massachi 
Michigan 
Minnesota 
Mississipf 
Missouri 
Montana 
Nebraska 
Nevada 
New Ham 
New Jersi 
New Mexi 
New York 
North Car 
North Daf 
Ohio
Oklahoma 
Oregon 
Pennsylva 
Rhode Isl 
South Cai 
South Dal 
Tennesse 
Texas 
Utah 
Vermont 
Virginia 
Washingt 
West Virg 
Wisconsir 
Wyoming
Data 
PCPI 
0.03972 
0.03865 
0.0421 
0.04393 
0.04042 
0.04335 
0.03844 
0.04072 
0.036 
0.03875 
0.04196 
0.04212 
0.04109 
0.03902 
0.03935 
0.03853 
0.04055 
0.04021 
0.04185 
0.04298 
0.03979 
0.04032 
0.03911 
0.03861 
0.04078 
0.0443 
0.03917 
0.03873 
0.04372 
0.0377 
0.0403 
0.0391 
0.03909 
0.03764 
0.0422 
0.04241 
0.03807 
0.04252 
0.03836 
0.03917 
0.03911 
0.04033 
0.04031 
0.04209 
0.04269 
0.03699 
0.03913 
0.04305 
0.03925 
0.04115
P11970
3562.8
4521.2 
2530 
4279
3152.4
2446.4
4208.6
3472.2 
4136
4317.8 
3321
2915.4 
4081
2991.2
2934.8
3420.8
3398.2 
3319
2716.2
2724.8
3302.2
3856.2
3951.4
3770.6
3483.6
2205.8
3341.4
3060.6 
2575
4105.2
3476.4 
4247
2732.4
4277.4 
2780
2796.4 
3612
2971.4
3464.4
3539.2
3604.4
3169.6 
2810
2734.4
3135.4
2901.6
3924.4
3252.2
3829.2
2628.2
High Schcx
41.2
66.7
58.1
39.9
62.7
63.9 
56
54.7
52.5
40.6
61.8
59.3
52.6 
53
58.9
59.9
38.6
42.2
54.6
52.3
58.4
52.8
57.6 
41
48.8
59.2
59.3
65.3
57.5
52.5
55.1
52.7
38.5
50.6
53.2
51.7
59.9
50.2
46.4
37.8
53.5
41.7
47.4
67.5
57.9
47.8 
63
41.7
54.5 
63.1
Pop Densit 65 Ye
67.9 
0.5
15.6 
37
127.6
21.3
623.6
276.5
125.5 
79
119.6 
8.6
199.4
143.9
50.5
27.5 
81.2
81
32.1
396.6 
727
156.3 
48
46.9
67.8
4.8
19.4
4.4
81.7
953.1
8.4
381.3
104.1
8.9 
260
37.2
21.7
262.3
902.5
85.7 
8.8
94.9
42.7
12.9
47.9
116.9
51.2
72.5 
81.1
3.4
Of Metro Pop Crime RateTaxRate 
1865.5 0.13746
2690.1
9.5
2.3
9.1
12.4 
9
8.5
9.5 
8
14.6 
8
5.7
9.5
9.8
9.5
12.4 
11.8
10.5
8.4
11.6
7.6 
11.2
8.5
10.7 
10 
12
9.9 
12.4
6.3 
10.6
9.7 
7
10.8
8.1
10.7
9.4
11.7 
10.9
10.8 
11
7.4 
12
9.8
8.9
7.4 
10.6
7.9
9.4 
11.1 
10.7
9
66
41.8 
74.5
38
96.3 
80.2
93
70.4
91.5 
61.2
81.9
15.7 
82.1
68.4
40.8
49.3
48.1
66.9
36.8
93.5
92.6
82.9
63.9
25.5
67.8
24.4
43.8
80.7
54.8 
100
44.8
91.3
54.2
31.7
80.4 
56
67.7
85.6
91.4 
58
23.2 
67
77.8
77.6
22.3
70.5
80.6 
39.1
68.3
32.4
0.21352
3445.7 0.15836
1603.8 0.12792
4306.9 0.15618
3661.3 0.14781
2574 0.12325
2973.6
3600
0.14979
0.12793
2207.2 0.13575
3395.7 0.15893
1785.4
2347.1
0.1485
0.13217
2270.2 0.13805
1435.6 0.15192
2145.4 0.14216
1924.6 0.13607
2404.6 0.16935
1141.1 0.14232
3346.7 0.1404
3004 0.13906
3790.1 0.15152
2103.8 0.16371
863.4 0.16715
2764.9 0.11947
1638 0.15249
1518.6 0.15404
3996.6
1193.1
0.16384
0.12136
2743 0.12374
2866.2 0.17626
3921.7 0.16931
1862.9 0.13133
846.2 0.18925
2377.5 0.11871
1949.3
2987.1 
1541.6
2926.1
0.1338
0.14417
0.12992
0.13368
2066.7 0.12878
1153 0.17756
1888.3 0.12807
2705.7 0.12666
2372.4 0.15615
1270.2 0.1685
2148.8 0.1254
3157 0.15618
959.2 0.13542
1515.6
1746
0.16857
0.1871
EduExp
219.37
661.79
338.23
187.71
312.24 
345.33
297.45 
446.64
259.08
248.27 
380.9
256.67 
299
299.27
333.85
286.45
237.51
239.77
252.21
329.17
258.1 
340.88 
385.53
217.68 
245.16
318.86 
281.93
279.18
256.09 
285.43
340.21
358.1 
238.35 
313.48 
245.82
245.71
333.18
272.1
275.52
231.2 
340.66
217.78 
251.58
353.86 
323.31 
264.85 
378.07 
239.26
353.21 
408.03
Emp South GSPGR(77 GSP1977 Growth Avg62
0.40956 1 0.02662 6977.75 0.02964 2854.8
0.4896 0 0.01693 18730.98 0.03218 2607.2
0.41462 1 0.02584 7896.81 0.03252 1843
0.41722 0 0.02689 6760.06 0.03362 2210.4
0.45233 0 0.02414 10267.85 0.03112 2429.8
0.46391 0 0.02589 9316 0.03477 1941.6
0.46544 0 0.03056 9509.41 0.03463 1557
0.49894 0 0.03267 9737.38 0.03069 2811
0.4333 1 0.02696 7446.2 0.03343 2883.2
0.46049 1 0.02858 7927.25 0.03293 2755.6
0.56828 0 0.02691 10264.82 0.03087 1913
0.45192 0 0.02376 7949.55 0.03211 2140.6
0.46238 0 0.02488 10114.31 0.03132 2469.2
0.44024 0 0.02435 8761.77 0.03138 2208.2
0.45769 0 0.02362 9060.13 0.03144 2123
0.45284 0 0.02437 8819 0.03306 2409.6
0.41361 1 0.02514 7975.38 0.0332 2520.4
0.39161 1 0.02113 9764.21 0.0318 2762.2
0.44733 0 0.02717 6827.58 0.03512 1644.2
0.43226 0 0.02765 8438.39 0.03078 2598.8
0.46969 0 0.03052 8699.54 0.03351 2025.2
0.39998 0 0.02354 9552.76 0.03164 2042
0.44532 0 0.02651 9084.78 0.03161 2214
0.41276 1 0.02607 6435.46 0.03159 2370.6
0.47028 0 0.02488 8667.62 0.03179 1886.6
0.43181 0 0.02095 8262.09 0.03317 2163.4
0.48066 0 0.02573 8758.63 0.03265 1649.2
0.51932 0 0.02433 10952.11 0.03537 1271.6
0.44976 0 0.03054 7301.63 0.03416 1903.8
0.43455 0 0.0306 9070.25 0.03469 1454.8
0.38985 0 0.02398 8440.76 0.03506 1707.2
0.46343 0 0.02788 9878.94 0.03515 1640.8
0.4841 1 0.02863 7828.71 0.03338 2246.8
0.4548 0 0.02264 8252.1 0.03094 2357.8
0.43893 0 0.02423 9074.17 0.03172 2177.8
0.4363 1 0.02165 8292.93 0.03344 1667.2
0.44083 0 0.02319 9189.72 0.03258 2002
0.44245 0 0.02574 8401.55 0.03467 1558
0.46334 0 0.02763 7622.02 0.03145 1943.2
0.46031 1 0.02827 6802.99 0.02978 2800.8
0.45587 0 0.02811 7429.69 0.03143 1924.4
0.45337 1 0.02816 7620.73 0.02991 2122.2
0.44901 1 0.0231 9990.76 0.03087 2293.6
0.42659 0 0.02446 7899.45 0.03017 2032.8
0.45934 0 0.02922 6814.66 0.03148 2253
0.46302 1 0.02805 8484.54 0.03223 2337.4
0.43634 0 0.02504 9522.42 0.03214 2293.8
0.37759 1 0.02223 7569.68 0.03282 1881.8
0.44147 0 0.02484 8803.46 0.03236 2252.4
0.47748 0 0.02116 13695.23 0.03287 1730.4
